Red Army invasion of Azerbaijan
Red Army invasion of Azerbaijan | |||||||
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Part of the Armenian–Azerbaijani War and the Russian Civil War | |||||||
![]() Red Army in Baku, May 1920 | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
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Commanders and leaders | |||||||
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The Red Army invasion of Azerbaijan, also known as the Sovietization or Soviet invasion of Azerbaijan, took place in April 1920. It was a military campaign conducted by the 11th Army of Soviet Russia with the aim of installing a new Soviet government in the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic.[1][2][3] This invasion occurred simultaneously with an anti-government insurrection organized by local Azerbaijani Bolsheviks in the capital city of Baku. As a result of the invasion, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic was dissolved, and the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic was established.[4][5]
Background
[edit]In early January 1920, Moscow issued an order to dissolve all national organizations in Azerbaijan and merge them into the local Communist party.[6] The newly formed Azerbaijan Communist Party (AzCP) aimed to unite all ethnicities in the region, eliminating divisions between Muslims and Turks.[7] Consequently, the Himmat party was disbanded; its members did not object.[8][clarification needed] The Constituent Congress of the AzCP had a majority of Muslim participants, with Himmat representatives equaling those of the Russian Communist Party (30 members). Additionally, 30 members came from Adalat,[clarification needed] and the remaining 60 represented various Communist cells, most of which were affiliated with Himmat.[9]
In early January 1920, Georgy Chicherin, the Commissar of Foreign Affairs of Soviet Russia, sent a note to Prime Minister Fatali Khan Khoyski. In the note, Chicherin called for an alliance against General Denikin, the leader of the White movement, with the intention of drawing the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic into the Russian Civil War.[10][11][12][13] The Allied Supreme Court[clarification needed] responded to Soviet pressure by providing military assistance to Azerbaijan. Khoyski, expecting timely support from the Allies, rejected Chicherin's initial demand.[10]
In a second note, Chicherin attacked the Azerbaijani government for refusing to join the Russian army against a common enemy. Khoyski's response in early February emphasized the need for Azerbaijan to be recognized as a sovereign and independent nation before further negotiations. Chicherin, in his subsequent note, dismissed Khoyski's requests for acknowledging Azerbaijan's independence, viewing Khoyski's demands as a rejection of Soviet proposals.[14]
During this time, the AzCP witnessed a growing number of followers, with membership reaching 4,000 individuals by late April 1920.[15] Many advocated for Azerbaijan to surrender to Soviet Russia as the only way to save the republic.[16] Notably, Mammad Hasan Hajinski, the interior minister at the time, strongly supported this idea.[17] Even after being reassigned to a less central position in the cabinet of ministers, Hajinski continued pro-Russian economic activities, including selling oil to the Soviets.[16]
On 23 March 1920, Armenians in Karabakh and Yerevan began protesting.[18] The Azerbaijani government responded by deploying a significant portion of its army to the region, leaving Baku and the northern territories with limited protection.[17] Meanwhile, the Bolshevik Eleventh Army was advancing through the North Caucasus, including Dagestan, and approaching the borders of Azerbaijan.[16]
By early 1920, Soviet Russia had been in dire need of oil supplies from Baku.[19] Vladimir Lenin, on 17 March 1920, sent the following telegraph to the Revolutionary Military Council on the Caucasus Front:
We absolutely must take Baku. Direct all your efforts to this end, but it is necessary to remain strictly diplomatic in your statements and to ensure to a maximum extent a solid preparation for the local Soviet power. Same applies to Georgia, although in this case I advise you to be even more careful.[20]
Subsequently, Sergo Ordzhonikidze, along with his deputy Sergey Kirov, were tasked with military actions aimed at conquering the territory under the auspices of the Caucasian Bureau; Alexander Serebrovsky was appointed the oversee the Baku oil fields.[21] In a state of confusion, Khoyski sent a note to Chicherin on 15 April, demanding an explanation for the approaching Bolshevik troops. Chicherin did not respond.[22]
The political landscape in Azerbaijan had also been shifting. Members of the Himmat party, who were aligned with the Mensheviks, joined the Communist Party, while the Ittihad party experienced a decline in membership in favor of the AzCP. Ussubakov's[clarification needed] government, which lost support from Ittihad due to members defecting to communism, resigned on 1 April.[23][12] Exploiting the situation, Hajinski formed a new cabinet. He engaged in continuous negotiations with Halil Pasha,[clarification needed] who regarded him as a friend of Turkey. Together with the AzCP, they drafted a resolution asserting that a Red Army invasion was unnecessary, as the Turkish Communist Party and the AzCP planned to organize an internal coup.[21] They also obtained confirmation from the 11th Army that it would refrain from intervening for a 24-hour period.[22]
Military operation
[edit]On 21 April 1920, Tukhachevsky issued the following directive for the 11th Red Army and the Volga-Caspian military flotilla to initiate an offensive towards Baku:
Azerbaijan's main forces are busy on the western side of the country. According to our intelligence, only a minor Azerbaijani force is defending the station of Yalama—Baku. In accordance with received directives, I order:
1. For the commander of 11th Army to cross the border Azerbaijan on April 27 and, in a quick offensive, to take control of the Baku province. Yalama—Baku operation to be concluded within 5 days. The cavalry units must be sent to take control of the Transcaucasian railroad around Kurdamir.
2. By the time, when 11th Army approaches the Absheron Peninsula, commander of the [Caspian] flotilla, Raskolnikov, to ensure landing of a small unit around the Alat station. This unit shall take orders from the commander of 11th Army. Make a quick raid to take control of Baku using all of the tanker fleet, prevent any damage to the oil fields[24]
The day after, Hajinski announced his failure to form a new cabinet.[25] On 24 April, the Bolshevik army commenced mobilization, occupying government buildings and imposing martial law in Baku.[25][26] Operations continued on 25 April, with all Communist party committee members facing the threat of immediate death if they failed to comply with orders. At midnight on 27 April, the Azerbaijani government learned that Russian troops were entering the country from the north. With most military forces deployed to Karabakh, only a small portion of the army remained available to confront them. General Aliagha Shikhlinski was unable to take military action to halt the Russian advance towards Baku.[26] On 28 April 1920, the Baku Revolutionary Committee officially requested aid from the Soviet Russian Government. However, the day before, on 27 April, the 11th Red Army, comprising the 26th, 28th, and 32nd rifle divisions and the 2nd mounted corps (consisting of over 30,000 soldiers), had already invaded Azerbaijan's territory.[24]
On the same day, the Russian Communist Party, Azerbaijan Communist Party, and the Caucasian Regional Committee established the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee, which proclaimed itself the sole lawful authority in the country. Nariman Narimanov was designated as the head of the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee, alongside members such as Mirza Davud Huseynov, Ghazanfar Musabakov, Hamid Sultanov, Dadash Buniatzada, Alimov, and Ali Heydar Garayev.[27] With the founding of AzRevKom, Sultanov promptly presented an ultimatum to the Parliament: surrender, transfer its powers, and dissolve within 12 hours.[25]
Parliament complied, and handed authority to the Communist Party under the following conditions:[28]
1. Full independence of Azerbaijan under Soviet power will be maintained.
2. The government formed by the Communist Party of Azerbaijan will have provisional authority.
3. The final system of government in Azerbaijan will be determined without any outside pressure, by the supreme legislative organ of Azerbaijan, the Soviet of Azerbaijani Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers.
4. All functionaries of the governmental agencies will retain their posts and only persons holding positions of responsibility will be replaced.
5. The newly formed provisional Communist government guarantees the life and property of the members of the present government and parliament.
6. It will take measures to prevent the entry of the Red Army under battle conditions.
7. The new government will resist, using strong measures and all the means at its disposal, all outside forces, from whatever quarter, aiming at the suppression of Azerbaijani independence.
The Azerbaijan Democratic Republic ceased to exist on 28 April 1920, when it was occupied.[12] The invasion of Azerbaijan had both economic and political motivations. The primary reason for the occupation was the country's oil resources, which would enable the Soviets to fulfill their territorial expansion plans.[29][19]
According to Russian historian A.B. Shirokorad, the Soviet invasion of Azerbaijan followed the Bolshevik strategy of having a local revolutionary committee incite worker riots and then seek assistance from the Red Army. This strategy would be employed again during the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.
References
[edit]- ^ Altstadt 1992, p. 108.
- ^ "Azerbaijan". International Encyclopedia of the First World War.
- ^ "Russian Civil War". Encyclopædia Britannica. 29 May 2024.
- ^ Cornell 2011, p. 31.
- ^ "Republic of Azerbaijan, pre-USSR (1918-1920)". Dead Country Stamps and Banknotes. 22 September 2012.
- ^ Swietochowski 2004, p. 171.
- ^ Swietochowski 1995, p. 90.
- ^ History of Azerbaijan. Administrative Department of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Presidential Library. p. 24.
- ^ Swietochowski 1995, p. 91.
- ^ a b Cornell 2011, p. 28.
- ^ "Anton Ivanovich Denikin". Encyclopædia Britannica.
- ^ a b c "Chronology of Major Events (1918–1920)". Azerbaijan International.
- ^ Isgenderli 2011, p. 197.
- ^ Swietochowski 2004, p. 175.
- ^ Swietochowski 1995, p. 93.
- ^ a b c Cornell 2011, p. 29.
- ^ a b Leeuw 2000, p. 52.
- ^ Swietochowski 2004, p. 177.
- ^ a b "Historical Overview". Communist Crimes.
- ^ Ленин В. И. Полное собрание сочинений Том 51. Письма: март 1920 г.
- ^ a b Swietochowski 1995, p. 92.
- ^ a b Isgenderli 2011, p. 200.
- ^ Swietochowski 2004, p. 178.
- ^ a b (Shirokorad 2006, pp. 232–244)
- ^ a b c Leeuw 2000, p. 53.
- ^ a b Swietochowski 2004, p. 180.
- ^ Altstadt 1992, p. 109.
- ^ Swietochowski 2004, p. 182.
- ^ Isgenderli 2011.
Bibliography
[edit]- History of Azerbaijan (PDF). Administrative Department of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Presidential Library.
- Altstadt, Audrey L. (1992). The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press. ISBN 0817991824.
- Cornell, Svante E. (2011). Azerbaijan Since Independence. United States of America: M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 978-0-7656-3002-5.
- Isgenderli, Anar (2011). Realities of Azerbaijan, 1917-1920. United States of America: Xlibris Corporation. ISBN 9781456879549.
- Kazemzadeh, Firuz (1950). The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917-1921). Anglo-Caspian Press Ltd. p. 360. ISBN 978-0-9560004-0-8.
- Leeuw, Charles van der (2000). Azerbaijan: A Quest for Identity. Richmond, England: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9780700711178.
- Shirokorad, Aleksandr B. (2006). Великая речная война, 1918–1920 годы. Вече. p. 416. ISBN 5-9533-1465-5.
- Swietochowski, Tadeusz (1995). Russia-Azerbaijan: A Borderline of Transition. United States of America: Columbia University Press. ISBN 0231070683.
- Swietochowski, Tadeusz (2004). Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920: The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim Community. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521263108.